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FROM REPRESENTING "CLIENTS" TO
SERVING "RECIPIENTS": TRANSFORMING
THE ROLE OF THE IV-D CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT ATTORNEY
Barbara Glesner Fines*
INTRODUCTION

A 'ITORNEYS for the poor are being asked to serve more clients
t-for less money and with more restrictions on their practice than
ever before. These restrictions, both on amounts and uses of funds,
influence the attorney's independent professional judgment. Determining
when that influence is inappropriate becomes a difficult practical and ethical issue. Is this issue resolved if one simply
reconceptualizes the role of the entities and individuals involved?
What if the government becomes the client and the individual receiving legal services becomes something other than a client? Examining
the development of governmental funding of child support enforcement, one finds just such a change in characterization has occurred.
Even in the face of massive cutbacks on federal support for welfare
and legal assistance alike over the past twenty years,' the governmental role in child support enforcement has swelled and no cutbacks are
forecast. Accompanying this growth has been an increasing focus on
the ethical issues presented by this representation. When the attorneys enforcing private child support orders are employed by the state,
identifying the client becomes a critical ethical task. Looked at from
the client's perspective, the role of the attorney appears little different
than the role of other legal services attorneys. The government is simply a third-party funder or, at best, a co-client similar to insurance
companies whose attorneys represent both insurer and insured.
Under either of these views, the attorney would owe a duty to the
parent as client.
Ten years ago, the states were significantly split on the this issue of
client identity.2 Today, nearly all states have statutes that specifically
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of

Law. Thanks to Dean Burnele Venable Powell for his support and to the members of
the Missouri Child Support Enforcement Association for their dialogue.
1. See Steven Epstein et al., The Future of Legal Services: Legal and EthicalImplicationsof the LSC Restrictions,25 Fordham Urb. LJ. 279,279-80 (1998) (describing
the history of "devastating funding cuts" of the Legal Services Corporation and its
effects on poverty representation); Nancy A. Wright, Welfare Reform Under the Personal Responsibility Act: Ending Welfare As We Know It or Governmental Child

Abuse?, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 357, 376 (1998) (noting that "average welfare benefits decreased an estimated 26% between 1972 and 1992").
2. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
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exclude the custodial parent as a client.' These statutes seemingly resolve the issue of dual representation or third-party interference with
the lawyer-client relationship. New issues arise, of course, regarding
the attorney's duty to be forthright with the recipients of legal services
about the nature of the relationship-but there is little question about
who gets to define the scope of representation or agree to limitations
on that scope.
Could this same recharacterization occur in other areas of government funding of legal services? Would such a recharacterization truly
solve the ethical dilemmas presented by government restrictions on
attorney representation? Part I this Article provides some background on the role of child support enforcement attorneys. Parts II
and III explores the reasons for characterizing the parent as client and
the issues such a characterization raises. Finally, part IV examines
statutes that deem the state to be the sole client in these actions and
will consider their philosophy, legality, and effectiveness.
I.

THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY IN
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

To appreciate the complex ethical issues presented to child support

enforcement attorneys, one must understand what they do. For purposes of comparison, I begin by describing the role of private attorneys in this field and then develop the powers and duties of public
enforcement attorneys. Custodial parents who can afford private attorneys can pursue a variety of enforcement avenues. As in personam
orders to pay money, the child support order is a unique beast, having
the characteristics of both a legal and equitable remedy. Thus, the
remedies for enforcement include not only the range of traditional
creditor's remedies, including garnishment, attachment, and liens,4 but
also civil contempt actions.5 Income withholding and other payment
systems have become popular recent adjuncts to the collection process
in all states.6
For most custodial parents, however, finding an attorney to pursue
these actions is at best problematic. Parents who need support are
3. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
4. See Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Enforcement of Claim for Alimony or
Support, or for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Incurred in Connection Therewith, Against
Exemptions, 52 A.L.R.5th 221, 264-70 (1997).
5. See Janelle T. Calhoun, Comment, Interstate Child Support Enforcement System: Juggernaut of Bureaucracy, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 921, 933-35 (1995) [hereinafter
Calhoun, Juggernaut];see also Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1993) (holding that
the trial court had the authority to use its contempt powers to enforce a child support
obligation in an instance of willful refusal to pay, and that the assignment of support
rights to the state does not deprive the court of this inherent power).
6. See Pamela Forrestall Roper, Note, Hitting Deadbeat Parents Where It Hurts:
"Punitive" Mechanisms in Child Support Enforcement, 14 Alaska L. Rev. 41, 45-48
(1997); Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, Consequences and Validity of Family Law Provisions in the "Welfare Reform Act", 14 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial L. 1, 22-35 (1997).
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least likely to be able to afford an attorney. Enforcement is expensive, especially in interstate enforcement actions. Moreover, traditional mechanisms for shifting or reducing legal fees are unavailable
or ineffective for most custodial parents. While most state statutes
allow the shifting of attorneys fees in actions to establish or enforce
support,' the possibility of having a fee judgment against a "deadbeat
parent" seems a minimal incentive for attorneys to extend their services contingent on that outcome. The rules of professional conduct in
most states prohibit the more traditional contingent fee arrangements.9 Thus, in the past, those parents unable to afford attorneys
were left with few options. Unless the public attorney or court trustees were willing to provide prosecution, custodial parents were left to
fend for themselves. During the 1970s, the problem of non-custodial
parents abandoning their children and moving to other jurisdictions to
avoid child support obligations escalated-the default rate for child
support payments averaged fifty percent. Nonpayment of child support was identified as a prime cause of poverty. 10 In response, the
public focus on child support has sharpened in recent years and the
enforcement mechanisms available have increased and diversified.
More significantly, the state and federal governments have made en7. As one article notes:
Unfortunately, those individuals who are the most in need of support payments are usually the least likely to have the personal, social, and financial
resources to initiate and pursue a legal action or actions. Moreover, the fact
that legal actions placed on backlogged court dockets can consume inordinate amounts of time coupled with the frequent need for repeated legal actions means that even those wvith access to the courts may have difficulty
ensuring that they receive an ongoing stream of child support.
Mark R. Fondacaro & Dennis P. Stolle, Revoking Motor Vehicle and Professional
Licenses for Purposes of Child Support Enforcement: ConstitutionalChallenges and
Policy Implications,5 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 355, 359-60 (1996); see also Sharon J.
Badertscher, Note, Ohio's Mandatory Child Support Guidelines: Child Support or
Spousal Maintenance?,42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 297, 309 (1992) (noting that the initial
costs of bringing enforcement actions is a factor explaining low collection rates).
8. See generally Wenona Y. Whitfield, Where the Wind Blows: Fee Shifting in
Domestic Relations Cases, 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 811 (1987) (noting that domestic
relations cases are an exception to the American rule in which parties bear their own
costs and proposing guidelines for setting fees in domestic relations actions).
9. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(d)(1) (1998); see also In re
Jarvis, 869 P.2d 671, 674 (Kan. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that a contingent fee agreement in a domestic relations matter is a clear violation of the Model Rules); Davis v.
Taylor, 344 S.E.2d 19, 22-23 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (voiding contingent fee arrangement in child support recovery as contrary to public policy); Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Fagin, 848 P.2d 11, 14-16 (Okla. 1992) ("[Amny type of fee [in a domestic relations
matter] which has some aspect of a contingency is impermissible." (emphasis omitted)); cf. Kathleen Pepi Southern, Note, ProfessionalResponsibility-ContingentFees
in Domestic Relations Actions: Equal Freedom to Contractfor the Domestic Relations
Bar, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 381 (1984) (arguing for judicial scrutiny of contingent fee arrangements in domestic relations cases).
10. Harry D. Krause reviews the history of child support legislation and its link to
poverty in Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public
Interest, 24 Fam. L.Q. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Krause, Child Support].
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With this assistance,

the role of the public attorney has grown dramatically.
Public attorneys have always had a role to play in support enforcement through the prosecution of criminal contempt or criminal nonsupport actions. The role of public attorneys in child support enforcement, however, grew dramatically with the creation in 1975 of the
Child Support Enforcement ("CSE") Program under Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act ("IV-D Program")."' The IV-D Program is
designed to provide aid to children in poverty due to parental desertion, death, or disability.' 3 The IV-D Program conditions the state's
receipt of federal welfare funds on the state act establishing a plan and
program to provide child support enforcement assistance.' 4 Under
the federal guidelines, state child support enforcement services must
be available to custodial parents currently receiving welfare benefits
(formerly Aid to Families with Dependant Children ("AFDC"), now
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF")) 15 or foster care
benefits,' 6 and to parents who have received AFDC in the past.' 7
Assistance to these parents is automatic because both the federal and
state law require that these parents assign their support rights to the
state.' 8 Even those parents who do not receive public assistance must
be provided enforcement services upon application. 19
All states participate in the IV-D Program. 20 The programs are
structured as separate divisions or agencies, generally within the social
11. "The total IV-D child support caseload grew by 867 percent between 1976 and
1995 from 2.1 to 20.1 million. The average increase in caseload was 740,000 per year
through 1984 and 1.1 million per year from 1985 to 1995." Office of Child Support
Enforcement, 20th Annual Report to Congress (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/rpt/20t/chl4.htm>
[hereinafter OCSE, Annual
Report].
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. 11 1996).
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(2), (a)(27), 652(a)(7)-(8) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. II 1996). From 1984 until 1996, federal
law required that the state disregard the first $50 of current child or spousal support
paid to the state in calculating AFDC payments and required this $50 to be paid by
the state agency directly to the family. See id. § 657(b)(1). These "pass through" requirements offered a cash incentive to aid recipients to ensure their cooperation. The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 eliminated
this "pass through" requirement. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-603(a) (Supp. II 1996)) (detailing the TANF program).
Although the $50 pass-through has been eliminated, former welfare recipients will be
given priority over the state in receiving collected child support arrearages. See 42
U.S.C. § 657(a)(2).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A)(II).
17. See id. § 654(6).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1994).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1996).
20. See OCSE, Annual Report, supra note 11.
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services department of the state.2 1 These child support enforcement
agencies ("CSEAs") provide a wide range of enforcement assistance
to custodial parents. State programs locate non-custodial parents; establish paternity; establish, enforce, and modify child and medical support orders; and collect support.' These programs may not handle
custody or visitation issues.'
Attorneys work within the system in a variety of ways. Most
CSEAs have staff counsel, 24 however, the caseloads far exceed what
staff counsel could handle in almost all states.25 Thus, CSEAs also use
other government attorneys to assist in enforcement actions, including
local prosecuting attorneys, attorneys from the state attorney general's office staff, or court trustee attorneys. 26 In the past, much of IVD enforcement was accomplished through contract with private attorneys. 7 Increasingly, states have full-time government attorneys perform the legal services needed. Some states have begun to contract8
out with private collection agencies for a portion of their work.
These agencies charge a certain percentage of collected support29funds
and most have attorneys on staff to handle court enforcement.
Funding for these legal services comes from a variety of sources.
Some revenue is generated by the cases themselves. States may retain
21. John Engler & Karen Quinn, On the Trail of Deadbeat Parents,77 Mich. BJ.
276 (1998) (describing Michigan's organization and operation of its child support enforcement program, which was a model for the IV-D program). For a comprehensive
set of tables describing the structure of each state's IV-D program, see the state
profiles index at Office of Child Support Enforcement, View Basic Facts Related to
Child Support (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http'//vwv.acf.dhhs.gov/programslcsel
fctdsc.htm> [hereinafter OCSE, View Basic Facts].
22. See Office of Child Support Enforcement, Handbook on Child Support Enforcement (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http'Jlvww.acf.dhhs.govlprogramsfsce/fctl
cshdbk.htm>.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1)-(2); Paula Roberts & Michael Allen, An AFDC
Mother's Right to Counse" Custody Issues in Proceedings Instigated by the IV-D
Agency, 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 278, 279 (1985).
24. See OFCE, View Basic Facts, supra note 21.
25. "Recent estimates of child support caseloads nationwide range from 300 cases
to as many as 2,500 cases per worker." Office of Child Support Enforcement, Privatization, Competition, and Partnership (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http./I
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/rptlpvtlch2.htm> [hereinafter OCSE, Privatization];
see Calhoun,Juggernaut,supra note 5, at 941-42.
26. See supra note 24.
27. For example, the history of Kentucky's IV-D evolution is described in an action to recover from the state payments for IV-D services. See Kenton County Fiscal
Ct. v. Elfers, No. 1997-CA-001971-MR, 1998 WL 754457, at *1-*3 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct.
30, 1998).
28. See OCSE, Privatization,supra note 25 (noting those services that -traditionally are contracted out such as genetic testing, legal services, and automated systems"
and describing efforts to privatize other aspects of child support enforcement).
29. See Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run State Welfare Programs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1996, at Al; Robert Elder, Jr., A Strange But Happy
Story; Venture Capital Meets Child Support, Tex. Law., Jan. 19, 1998, at 2; Tamar
Lewin, PrivateFirms Help Single Parents Get What's Due, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1994,
at Al.
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a share of the support collected in some cases to reimburse their own
welfare expenditures.30 Awards of attorneys fees have been made to
agency attorneys in some states. 31 Most funding comes from the fed-

eral government. The federal government pays sixty-six percent of
state administrative costs, with higher percentages for certain aspects
of the programs. 32 Additionally, an elaborate system of "incentive
payments" tied to the effectiveness of enforcement efforts provides
additional funding to the states. 33 In fact, so effective are these funding mechanisms that all but eight states operate their programs at a
profit.3 4
The enforcement tools available to IV-D attorneys include all those
available to private attorneys. 35 IV-D attorneys also have a range of

enforcement tools uniquely available to them in their role as government attorneys. Access to government information sources allows for
easier location of absent parents. These sources include: state departments of motor vehicles, corrections, or human resources; records of
licenses, criminal files, and employment earnings; and federal data
from the IRS, SSA, or the Federal Parent Locator Services.

6

Legal

remedies uniquely available to IV-D attorneys include forfeiture of
licenses. 37 Another highly effective collection method is to intercept
tax refunds, unemployment compensation payments, lottery winnings,
or other government funds the non-custodial parent may have coming.38 Finally, only government attorneys may prosecute criminal
sanctions, whether under criminal contempt for violation of the court
order of support or under the distinct criminal statute prohibiting
criminal non-support.3 9 Most recently the federal government has

30. See 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1996).
31. See, e.g., Patch v. Patch, 760 P.2d 526, 531 (Alaska 1988) (granting attorneys
fees to Child Support Enforcement Division attorney); Florida Dep't of Revenue v.
Barranco, 673 So. 2d 923, 923-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that in support
enforcement actions, the state agency is entitled to pay the attorney's fees based on
non-custodial parent's ability to pay).
32. Ninety percent of the costs of genetic testing and 80%-90% of automation
costs are paid by the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 655. The Secretary of
Health and Human Services promulgated regulations for determining exactly which
state expenditures are reimbursable. See 45 C.F.R. § 304.20 (1997).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 658 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
34. See Administration for Children and Families Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs., Nineteenth Annual Report to Congress (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/rptlchforwa.htm>.
35. See Schoonmaker, supra note 6, at 29-35 (cataloguing enforcement tools).
36. See id. at 10-16.
37. See Fondacaro & Stolle, supra note 7, at 390-93.
38. See Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed: Federalizationof Enforcement
Nears Completion, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 695, 697.
39. See Mark S. Coven, Welfare Reform, Contempt and Child Support Enforcement, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1067, 1080-95 (1997); Diana J. Vogt, Note, Modern Discussion of a Venerable Power: Civil Versus Criminal Contempt and Its Role in Child
Support Enforcement. Hicks v. Feiock, 22 Creighton L. Rev. 163, 164-170 (1988).
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stepped in to provide Federal prosecution for non-support where parents cross state lines to avoid paying support obligations.4"
The role of public attorneys in the future is in question. There is no
question of the program's success in terms of utilization: approximately sixty percent or more of all child support cases are brought
through IV-D programs. 4 As in other publicly assisted legal services,
IV-D attorney staffs carry overwhelming caseloads, and funding for
these efforts is justified only to the extent that the welfare rolls are
reduced as a result of enforcement. Recent studies have questioned
the effectiveness of child support enforcement in altering the amount
of public assistance required.4 2 With current welfare reform otherwise
reducing public assistance, it may be that public-assisted enforcement
will be on the wane, with a return to privatization. To the extent that
government attorneys continue to play a predominant role in child
support enforcement, the ethical issues presented by their unique role
will continue to present problems for the attorneys, the participants,
and the programs. Even if the government role in child support enforcement does change, however, the approach to providing legal
assistance in this program may become a model for other government
legal assistance.
II.

THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUSTODIAL PARENTS
AND CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ATTORNEYS

The ethical dilemmas created by the IV-D Program of child support
enforcement are in many respects similar to those of many attorneys
providing legal assistance to low-income persons through the auspices
of programs funded by governments or other third parties. Who is the
client? Who can decide who is the client? What are the attorney's
duties to those who are not clients?
Even for the private attorney, child support practice presents ethical issues of client identity and the fairness to third parties. A private
attorney, hired by a custodial parent to establish, modify, or enforce a
child support order, is nominally representing the parent.4 3 Yet the
custodial parent is acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the
40. See Kathleen A. Burdette, Comment, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child
Support Enforcement After United States v. Lopez, 144 U. Pa. L Rev. 1469, 1470-75

(1996).
41. See Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 Fain. L.Q. 519, 522 (1996).

42. See, e.g., Krause, Child Support, supra note 10, at 15-17 (noting that "child
support enforcement has not significantly improved the poorest children's lot").

43. See John David Meyer, Note, The "Best Interest of the Child" Requires Independent Representationof Children in Divorce Proceedings,36 J.Fam. L 445 (199798) (noting that children are rarely appointed representatives in divorce actions and
arguing that this independent representation should be required).
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child.4 4 Thus, does the attorney representing a custodial parent in a

child support action have any ethical duty that runs to the child? The
problem is present whenever an attorney is representing a party acting
in a fiduciary capacity, but is aggravated because the beneficiary is a
minor.45

A non-custodial parent does not owe a duty of child support to the
custodial parent. 46 Rather, both parents have a duty of support that is
owed to the child. 47 Nonetheless, when it comes to actual enforce-

ment of that duty, one finds some ambiguity in the law's attitude toward the parent's representative role. Thus, in paternity actions, the
courts are split on the extent to which a prior paternity action brought
by a mother will preclude her child's subsequent action against the
same putative father.4 8 Some courts hold that the parent represents
the child's interests in these actions, creating privity for preclusion
analysis. 49 Others do not find that the interests of the parent are coextensive with those of the child. Likewise, in child support actions,
44. See Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation- The
Proper Roles of Children, Parents and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol'y 423, 423-27 (1993).
45. See Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 659, 696-98 (1994); Jeffrey N. Pennell,
RepresentationsInvolving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 Fordham L. Rev
1319, 1321-22 (1994).
46. See Harry D. Krause, Child Support in America: The Legal Perspective 6
(1981) (noting the equalization of child support obligations between fathers and
mothers).
47. See id.
48. See Jessica G. v. Hector M., 653 A.2d 922, 926-28 (Md. 1995) (providing extensive review of various state court decisions).
49. See, e.g., Department of Human Servs. v. Seamster, 820 S.W.2d 298, 299-300
(Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (en banc) (holding that a mother's unsuccessful paternity action
for child support barred her child's subsequent paternity action); Bradley v. Division
of Child Support Enforcement, 582 A.2d 478, 480-82 (Del. 1990) (same); Department
of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Ricks, 530 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(same); J.D. v. E.W. by C.W., 610 N.E.2d 289, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (same);
T.R. v. A.W. by Pearson, 470 N.E.2d 95, 96-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (same); O'Bannon
for O'Bannon v. Azar, 506 So. 2d 522, 526 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (same); E.I.B. by I.J. v.
J.R.B.. 611 A.2d 662, 663-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (same). Cf. Guzicjka v.
Desgranges, 571 A.2d 32, 34 (R.I. 1990) (adopting the privity-preclusion principle but
refusing to ban the child's suit where the earlier case was procedurally flawed).
50. See, e.g., Ex parte Snow, 508 So. 2d 266, 268 (Ala. 1987) (holding that the
differing interests of mother and child foreclose the application of res judicata when
the child was not a party to the prior action); Department of Health & Rehab. Servs.
v. Wyatt, 475 So. 2d 1332, 1333-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same); P.N.B. ex rel
J.L.S. v. J.L.D., 531 N.E.2d 1203, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Johnson v.
Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871, 874-77 (Minn. 1989) (same); Johnson v. Norman, 421 N.E.2d
124, 127 (Ohio 1981) (same); Department of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Gray v. Johnson, 376
S.E.2d 787, 790 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (same); State ex rel. Div. of Human Servs. v.
Benjamin P.B., 395 S.E.2d 220, 223-25 (W. Va. 1990) (noting that "there is a clear
distinction between the interests of the [mother] and the child in this proceeding since
the right to an adjudication of parentage and to support is primarily that of the
child").
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various legal doctrines recognize that parents might not truly represent the child's interests. For example, parents cannot by agreement
waive the right to child support.5 1 Such agreements between the parents regarding child support are not legally binding on either the public or the child, though they may be enforceable against one another
as to the parents' relative support obligations.52 Given courts' reluctance to bind a child to a parent's choice that is against that child's
best interest, a private attorney representing a custodial parent may
also view the client solely as a parent, rather than as a fiduciary for the
child. Attorneys are, of course, always free to discuss with their clients the ethical, moral, or practical effects of their choices.5 3 For the
private attorney, however, there is little danger in identifying the client to whom one owes the duties of loyalty, confidentiality, communication, and competence-the client is the parent.
When the attorney in a child support action is hired by the state
under a IV-D Program, the identification of the client is far more
complex. The problem goes beyond that faced by most prosecuting
attorneys, whose nebulous client is called "The State." While some
crime victims, for example, may believe that a prosecuting attorney is
"their lawyer," in general the public is aware that the prosecutor acts
on behalf of the state in criminal enforcement.5 4 This may be in part
because the elected nature of most prosecutor positions helps to inform the public of their role, or it may be in part because throughout
most of the twentieth century, private prosecution has been so rare.5 s
With child support enforcement, however, the "victims" (i.e., custodial parents seeking establishment of paternity or enforcement of support) are far more likely to view the CSEA attorney as representing
their interests. "Since the inception of the IV-D program, State IV-D
agencies have wrestled with the public perception that lawyers who
work for the program-such as prosecutors under cooperative agree-

51. See generally John J. Michalik, Annotation, Divorce: Powerof Court to Modify Decree for Support of Child Which Was Based on Agreement of Parties, 61

A.L.R.3d 657, 659 (1975) (considering "the question of the power of a court to modify
a decree for child support which was based upon a predivorce agreement of the parties" (footnote omitted)).
52. See id at 661.
53. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionalityof Private
Prosecutors,47 Ark. L. Rev. 511, 515-521 (1994) (reviewing the history of private

prosecutors in the United States).
54. Indeed, the struggle of victims to have a greater role in criminal prosecutions
is evidence of this recognition. See David L. Roland, Progressin the ictim Reform
Movement: No Longer the "Forgotten Victim", 17 Pepp. L Rev. 35, 53-56 (1989); cf.

State ex reL Romley v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 891 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz.
1994) (rejecting the argument that the Victims' Bill of Rights created so many duties
toward victims that prosecutors represented the victims for purposes of conflicts of
interest).
55. See Bessler, supra note 53, at 558-66.
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ment or as hired counsel for the agency-'represent'
in an 'attorney56
client' sense, the individuals the program serves.
If one applies the same type of analysis used to identify clients in
any other legal setting, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
custodial parents, acting on behalf of their children, are the clients of
these public enforcement attorneys. Whether an attorney-client relationship exists is determined by principles of substantive law. Under
the law of agency, an attorney-client relationship arises when "[a] person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide
legal services for the person; and . . . [t]he lawyer manifests to the
person consent to do so.""7 This approach to defining the client is
based largely on client expectations. Were this approach to apply to
IV-D representation, the client would often include the custodial
parents.5 8
Although the IV-D Program was designed primarily to serve those
parents receiving AFDC, any parent or guardian may apply to receive
legal services to assist in paternity or child support issues. 59 Parents
who do not receive public assistance ("non-recipients") may have an
entirely reasonable expectation that the attorney who proceeds with
their case is representing them. They apply for the legal services, pay
(in most states) an application fee, and are not required to assign their
rights to the state. 60 Any child support collected must be paid to the
family.6 1 After all, the state has no direct financial interest in enforcing child support for these parents; rather, the assistance is based on
the general interest in preventing parents from reaching such dire financial conditions that public assistance will be necessary. 62
56. Office of Child Support Enforcement, Role of IV-D Agency and Its Staff in
Delivering Program Services (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/im-9303.htm> [hereinafter OCSE, Delivering ProgramServices].
57. Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 26 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
58. See Paula Roberts, Attorney-Client Relationship and the IV-D System: Protection Against InadvertentDisclosure of Damaging Information, 19 Clearinghouse Rev.
158, 158-59 (1985).
59. Under the Social Security Act of 1935,42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(A) (1994) (amended

1996), states are required to provide to families not receiving public assistance all of
the services provided to families that do receive public assistance. See generally
Carelli v. Howser, 923 F.2d 1208, 1210 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[sitates are required to provide child support enforcement services to families that receive AFDC
benefits as well as families that do not"); Thaysen v. Thaysen, 583 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla.
1991) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 654(6)(A)); Cabinet for Hum. Resources v. Houck, 908
S.W.2d 673, 674 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (citing similar provisions in the Kentucky Re-

vised Statutes).
60. See 45 C.F.R. § 302.33 (1994).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(3) (Supp. I 1996).
62. Challenges to the constitutionality of allowing enforcement actions on behalf
of financially-able custodial parents have been based on state constitutional provisions requiring the expenditure of public funds only for public purposes. The challenges have met with little success. Courts have held that "[s]pending public funds in
aiding an obligee to enforce support payments is analogous to, and as much a public
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As a practical matter, however, many of these non-recipient cases
are more accurately viewed as "continuation" cases: that is, the parents applying for support enforcement services had received public
assistance in the past.63 Even after parents cease receiving public
assistance, federal law requires that state agencies continue to provide
child support enforcement services.' In some of these cases, the state
may have a more direct financial interest. If child support arrearages
exist, they can be applied toward unreimbursed public assistance.'
The factual basis for an attorney-client relationship with the parents,
however, is not eliminated by the fact that the state also has a direct
financial interest in these cases. Regardless of the priority of financial
interests, these continuation case parents also have a reasonable expectation that the enforcement attorney is acting on their behalf.
Moreover, it appears that an increasing percentage of IV-D enforcement actions are brought on behalf of non-recipients. "Enhanced enforcement in Title IV-D cases vil encourage many medium
and high income obligees, who traditionally have not enforced support obligations through state child support agencies, to opt into the
system."6 6 In 1990, AFDC cases outnumbered non-AFDC cases by
two to one in IV-D collection actions. By 1994, the ratio was much
smaller, due to an increase of nearly four million non-AFDC cases.67
Parents receiving public assistance or foster care assistance present
an arguably different situation. For these parents, no application for
legal services is necessary. In fact, these parents have little choice as
to whether to seek legal assistance. Under federal law, these parents

purpose as, relief expenditures to needy individuals." Department of Human Ser'. ex
rel Pavlovich v. Pavlovich, 932 P.2d 1080, 1084 n.7 (Okla. 1996) (citation omitted); see

also Houck, 908 S.W.2d at 674-75 (holding that non-recipients were entitled to the
services of the county attorney in an enforcement proceeding); fi re Marriage of
Lappe, 680 N.E.2d 380, 388-89 (II1. 1997) (holding that "public purpose" includes pro-

moting the rights of children in enforcement actions).
63. See Implementing Welfare Revision: CongressionalTestimony Before the Sub-

comm. on Hwnan Resources of the Senate Comn on Ways and Means, 104th Cong.
(1996) (Prepared Testimony of Leslie L. Frye, Chief of the California Office of Child
Support) (estimating that "about 50% of the families we serve as 'non-welfare' are
actually 'continuing services' families who entered our system through an application
for cash benefits. In low grant states the continuing service population is even higher,
up to 75% in Texas"), available in 1996 WL 10831315.
64. See supra note 59.
65. Until recently, states had the option of recovering past welfare costs before
paying families for post-welfare arrearages. Under the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, families have the priority in receiving
arrearages. See 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2)(B)(i)(II)(aa) (Supp. 11 1996).
66. Schoonmaker, supra note 6, at 69.
67. See id "In 1990, there were 8.0 million AFDC and 4.8 million non-AFDC
Title IV-D cases. Four years later, there were 10.4 million AFDC and 8.2 million nonAFDC Title IV-D cases." Id. (footnote omitted); see also In re Marriageof Lappe, 680
N.E.2d at 390-91 (indicating that half of IV-D cases involved non-AFDC litigants).
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are required to assign their rights to past-due support to the state 6 a
and must agree to cooperate in establishing and enforcing paternity
and support rights as a condition of receiving aid.6 9 Whenever rights
are assigned, the attorney's client may change with that assignment.
One may argue, then, that the state agency to whom support rights are
deemed assigned becomes the sole client of the public attorney.
Unlike many voluntary assignments of rights of action, however,
these parents retain a significant interest in the paternity and support
actions the law deems "assigned" to the state. 70 Custodial parents retain the right to enforce support obligations, though recoveries must
be used to reimburse the state to the extent of AFDC payments received. 7 1 The situation is better analogized to the relationship between attorneys for insurers and the insured they represent. In that
setting, all courts hold that there exists an attorney-client relationship
between the recipient of the legal services (the insured) and the attorney providing those services.72 Attorneys in child support actions
speak on behalf of parents to some extent. Because attorneys as a
rule may not speak on behalf of persons they do not represent, the
recipient parent should be considered a client.7 3
Many recipient parents may indeed expect that the IV-D attorney is
representing their interests. One can argue that this is an unreasonable expectation given the assignment of rights required by the statutes.
That argument assumes, however, that the reasonable person would

be aware of the required assignment, its legal effect, and the resultant
impact on the formation of an attorney-client relationship. That argu68. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (Supp. 111996); Langan v. Weeks, 655 A.2d 771, 781
(Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (upholding the statutory assignments of child support benefits
as consistent with substantive due process).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2). Parents may refuse to cooperate if they have "good
cause," see id., often defined in terms of cooperation leading to physical harm, see id.
§ 654(29).
70. "[Ilt does not necessarily follow from the combination of federal and state
statutes and regulations that the assignment utterly destroys any interest the custodial
parent had in the other parents' [sic] duty to pay or payments which are made." Medsker v. Adult & Family Servs. Div., 601 P.2d 865, 867 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
that an AFDC recipient has no due process right to be informed of the effect of the
law on her rights to collected support).
71. See, e.g., Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Wallace, 941 S.W.2d 430, 432
(Ark. 1997) (involving an AFDC recipient who had assigned her rights to child support to the state, in which the court ruled that, because the state refused to assist her
in this action, it was estopped from claiming those support payments awarded).
72. See 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 28.3, at 487
(4th ed. 1996) (noting that most courts find that the attorney represents the insurer as
well); Thomas D. Morgan, Whose Lawyer Are You Anyway?, 23 Wm. Mitchell L.
Rev. 11, 11-16 (1997) (defending the Restatement's position that insurance company
attorneys represent only the insured).
73. Cf. Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The ProfessionalResponsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 Duke L.J. 255, 276 & n.47 (1995) (citing Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(0(2) (1994) for the proposition that an attorney's primary duty runs to the represented child and not to a third-party payor).
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ment seems a far stretch. What the recipient parents are most likely
to realize is that they have a financial interest in these legal actions.
Establishing paternity and support orders will inure to the financial
benefit of the custodial parent even after public assistance has ended.
Even in the recovery of current support, recipient parents may receive
a portion of the recovered amounts.74
Moreover, enforcement attorneys and the courts may act as if the
parent is client, referring to parents as "clients" or entering appearances "on behalf of' the parent.7 It is not uncommon for pleadings
to be filed in the parent's name. Even when the state proceeds on its
own, the action may be styled "State ex rel. Parent," which, as one
court noted, indicates that the parent is "quasi the plaintiff in the proceeding. ' 76 The parents are required to act as if the attorneys are representing them. It is not unreasonable for the parents to expect that
representation truly is on their behalf.
Indeed, even if one were to conclude that the state is the client
when there has been an assignment of rights, the attorney has a duty
to fully explain his or her role to the custodial parent, as the duties of
confidentiality and loyalty may still attach to the parent. As the ABA
Informal Opinion addressing the role of the IV-D attorney notes:
If the lawyer fails to make an explanation sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 4.3 and receives a communication from the
custodial parent who reasonably misunderstands the lawyer's role,
the lawyer may be prohibited, under Model Rule 1.6, from disclosing the communication to the lawyer's actual client, the state....
Under these circumstances there is a conflict of interest requiring
the lawyer to withdraw from the representation. 77
Because attorneys do not normally advocate for interests that they
do not represent, one method of identifying the client is to ask: "Who
owns the rights being asserted?" Rather than focusing on the expectations of the parties, this approach looks to the ownership of the rights.
This analysis, often used in establishing rights of action for third-party
beneficiaries of legal services, is especially helpful in identifying the
parents as "clients" in IV-D actions. On the other hand, this analysis
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1) (Supp. 111996).
75. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae for the National District Attorneys Association, et al., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (No. 95-1441) ("Attorneys and
paraprofessional staff practicing under Title IV-D are committed to serving families,
and particularly, children in need."), available in 1996 WL 419711, at '27.
76. State Dep't of Family Servs. v. Peterson, 960 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Wyo. 1998)

("The Department may bring this action in its own name, without regard to the obligee's status as a recipient of non-recipient of public assistance." (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1159 (5th ed. 1979)).
77. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 89-1528
(1989) (citing Model Rules of Professional Responsibility Rules 1.7(b), 1.16(a)

(1987)).
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may create only a "quasi-client" status: with a duty of competence,
perhaps confidentiality, but not control.7 8
Under this approach, attorneys would clearly be representing nonrecipient parents, as well as parents in paternity actions. Unless legislation gives the state a more direct interest, the only party who owns a
right to paternity or support in these cases must necessarily be the
custodial parent acting on behalf of the child. Indeed, in many states,
prior to legislation allowing intervention by state agencies, CSE attorneys were considered to be representing the parent because the state
had no standing to intervene in paternity cases.7 9 In the past, this view
of the parent as client was the approach taken by the ABA8" and a
number of states.8 ' A 1993 study by the United States Office of Child
Support Enforcement indicated that as many as fourteen states created attorney-client relationships with the parents or children.8 2
While no state clearly takes that position today, a few states do provide that the attorneys performing child support functions represent
or act on behalf of either the state, the parties, or both.83
78. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 73 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996). The Restatement suggests several circumstances in which an attorney might be liable for negligence to one who is not a client. These include circumstances in which the lawyer's client is a "fiduciary acting primarily to perform similar
functions for the non-client" and when "the non-client is not reasonably able to protect its rights." Id. These provisions suggest a duty of competence to non-clients.
However, the Restatement is careful to limit the reach of this duty, indicating that no
duty should be implied at all unless "such a duty would not significantly impair the
performance of the lawyer's obligations to the client." Id. One of the fundamental
reasons courts will reject third-party liability is the danger that it might interfere with
the real client's control in the representation. For a thorough discussion of the issues
of third-party liability, see the articles in the symposium, The Lawyer's Ditties and
Liabilities to Third Parties, 37 So. Tex. L. Rev. 957 (1996).
79. See Telephone Interview with Geraldine Hasegawa, Hawaii Corporation
Counsel, Family Support Division (Dec. 9, 1996); see also Cabinet for Human Resources v. Houck, 908 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing a denial of
intervention by a county attorney in a divorce proceeding, and commenting that "the
county attorney ... was attempting to represent the applicants").
80. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 891528 (1989) (concluding that a IV-D attorney represents the parent in non-AFDC
cases; the state in assignment cases; and both the state and the parent in continuation
cases).
81. See infra note 95.
82. See OCSE, Delivering Program Services, supra note 56.
83. The Minnesota statute provides that:
If the public authority charged by law with support of a child is a party, the
county attorney shall represent the public authority. If the child receives
public assistance and no conflict of interest exists, the county attorney shall
also represent the custodial parent. If a conflict of interest exists, the court
shall appoint counsel for the custodial parent at no cost to the parent. If the
child does not receive public assistance, the county attorney may represent
the custodial parent at the parent's request.
Minn. Stat. § 257.69 (1992); see Ala. Code § 30-3-63 (1989) (payment of fees section
indicates that "when representing or otherwise acting on behalf of the obligee neither
the state of Alabama nor any agency thereof ... shall be required to pay the fees
prescribed by this subsection"); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-210 (Michie 1998) (stating

1999]

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ATTORNEY

2169

The problems posed by this approach were the same as those faced
by attorneys employed by any third party who significantly controlled
the terms of the representation. From the custodial parent's perspective, the IV-D attorney's representation was an encyclopedia of ethics
violations. Government funding was often inadequate to provide a
satisfactory level of competence or diligence.84 Parents were not afforded their rightful control over the objectives of representation.85
IV-D attorneys might regularly find themselves in a conflict of interest.86 The attorney representing both the parent in recovering current
support, and the state in seeking reimbursement for past support assigned as a condition of receiving AFDC, for example, could face conflicting goals and loyalties to these two clients.a7 Former client
conflicts would be common, as attorneys would bring actions against
former parent-clients as custody changed or as federal regulations required IV-D services in modifying awards.s
Perhaps the most difficult ethical dilemma arises from the parent's
communications with the IV-D attorney. If the custodial parent is the
client, he or she is owed the duty of confidentiality as to any information relating to the representation 9 and the attorney-client privilege
would attach to communication between the parent and the attorney.' If the attorney also represents the state, there is a duty to keep
the state informed of relevant information 9 and there is no privilege
that the attorney shall represent the petitioner); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 576D-3(b) (1993)
("The agency may commence or appear in any action on its own behalf, on behalf of
any dependent child or custodial parent, or on behalf of any other person for whom
the agency has a duty to obtain or enforce an order of support under this chapter.");
Idaho Code § 56-203C (1994) (stating that an attorney can represent a child or appear
as a friend of court); Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 10-115 (1991) (-Administration or
an individual whom the Administration approves for child support services shall be
represented"); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (stating that a
plaintiff "may be represented by the IV-D agency"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 546.12
(1997) (stating the title of the section as Official to Represent Obligee); Tex. Hum.
Res. Code Ann. § 76.007 (West 1990) ("may represent the state or other parties");
Wash. Rev. Code § 74.20.220 (Supp. 1999) (stating that the attorney involved in child
support obligation actions "represents the state, the best interests of the child relating
to parentage, and the best interests of the children of the state, but does not represent
the interests of any other individual"); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-106 (Michie 1997) (stating that "Department has cause of action which may be brought and maintained
either in the department's own name or in the name of the obligee or obligor").
84. For rules concerning a lawyer's competence and obligation to communicate
with the client, see Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.1, 1.4 (1998).
85. For a rule on the scope of representation, see Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.2.
86. For a rule on conflicts of interest concerning former clients, see id. Rule 1.9.
87. For a general rule on conflicts of interest, see id. Rule 1.7.
88. All TANF cases must be reviewed every three years and the pursuit of nodification of any order, whether upward or downward, not in compliance with support
standards also must be reviewed. See 45 C.F.R. § 303.8 (1997).
89. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6.
90. See iU; Roberts, supra note 58, at 159.
91. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4.
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among co-clients. Under these circumstances, attorneys in any other
setting could simply inform the client of the limitations on confidentiality and the client could then choose the extent to which he or she
would disclose information to the attorney. The IV-D Program, however, requires that states mandate the cooperation of each applicant
or recipient 92 as a condition of eligibility for aid.93 This duty to provide information without the protections of confidentiality presents a
nearly irresolvable conflict if the attorney is viewed as representing
both the parent and that state.
These difficulties and conflicts began to surface dramatically in a
series of actions brought under § 198394 against IV-D agencies. These
actions required the federal courts to determine whether the IV-D
Program created private rights enforceable under the Civil Rights
Act. This determination, analogous to the identification of the client,
92. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (29)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1998). This statute provides:
[Tihe State agency responsible for administering the State plan(A) shall make the determination (and redetermination at appropriate intervals) as to whether an individual who has applied for or is receiving assistance under the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, the
State program under part E of this subchapter, the State program under subchapter XIX of this chapter, or the food stamp program, as defined under
section 3(h) of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. § 2012(h)), is cooperating in good faith with the State in establishing the paternity of, or in establishing, modifying, or enforcing a support order for, any child of the
individual by providing the State agency with the name of, and such other
information as the State agency may require with respect to, the noncustodial parent of the child, subject to good cause and other exceptions
which(i) in the case of the State program funded under part A of this subchapter, the State program under part E of this subchapter, or the State
program under subchapter XIX of this chapter shall, at the option of the
State, be defined, taking into account the best interests of the child, and
applied in each case, by the State agency administering such program; and
(ii) in the case of the food stamp program, as defined under section 3(h) of
the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. § 2012(h)), shall be defined and applied in each case under that program in accordance with section 6(l)(2) of
the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. § 2015(l)(2));
(B) shall require the individual to supply additional necessary information
and appear at interviews, hearings, and legal proceedings; ...
Id. § 654 (29).
93. See id. § 608(a)(2). The statute provides:
If the agency responsible for administering the State plan approved under
part D [of this subchapter] determines that an individual is not cooperating
with the State in establishing paternity or in establishing, modifying, or enforcing a support order with respect to a child of the individual, and the
individual does not qualify for any good cause or other exception established
by the State pursuant to section 654(29) of this title, then the State-(A)
shall deduct from the assistance that would otherwise be provided to the
family of the individual under the State program funded under this part an
amount equal to not less than 25 percent of the amount of such assistance;
and (B) may deny the family any assistance under the State program.
Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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split the circuits. A number of courts held that parents are intended
beneficiaries of Title IV-D, 95 basing their decisions on the express language of Congress in the Social Security Act 96 and the provision of
services that directly benefit custodial parents. 97 These courts also relied on the abundant legislative history providing evidence that Title
IV-D was designed to benefit parents and children. In the original
legislation, the bill noted that "all children have the right to receive
support from their fathers" and that in fact "the right to have their
fathers identified so that support can be obtained" was identified by
the Senate report as a key purpose of the IV-D program.9" Likewise,
the House Report on the Child Support Enforcement Act of 1984
(which amended the IV-D Program) identified the purpose of the legislation as "the larger social responsibility for making sure that all children receive financial support .... The objectives behind the program
are greater than merely recouping federal and state AFDC
expenditures." 99

Other courts concluded that Title IV-D created no enforceable
rights. 1°° The analysis of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Wehunt v. Ledbetter represents this position: 0 t
Title IV-D is also not a legal assistance program. AFDC recipients
do not apply for nor request support enforcement services. They
assign their child support rights to the state and are required to co-

95. See, e.g., Doucette v. Ives, 947 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The CSE program
[was] designed both to assist parents in collecting child support ... and to reduce state
and federal government AFDC expenditures"); Carelli v. Howser, 923 F.2d 1208,
1211 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that Title IV-D was intended both "to protect needy
families with children [and to protect] the public fisc"); Monzon v. Martinez, 833 F.
Supp. 479,484-85 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that custodial parents in need of Title IV-D
services have enforceable rights under the statute); King v. Bradley, 829 F. Supp. 989,
992 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stating that "Title IV-D is intended to benefit the plaintiffs");
Howe v. Ellenbecker, 774 F. Supp. 1224, 1226 (D.S.D. 1991) (noting that Congress
intended to provide assistance to all children in need); Behunin v. Jefferson County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 744 F. Supp. 255, 257-58 (D. Colo. 1990) (finding that Congress
primarily intended Title IV-D to secure support enforcement services for children and
their families); Beasley v. Harris, 671 F. Supp. 911, 921 (D. Conn. 1987) (finding that
Congress intended to enlarge the assistance to the family). Bt see Albiston v. Maine
Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d 258, 265 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding that IV-D is
meant to benefit children and that it is mandatory).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 651 (noting that the purpose of Title IV-D is to "assur[e] that
assistance in obtaining support will be available... to all children").
97. In Howe, 8 F.3d at 1262, the court found the following provisions to indicate
an intent to benefit parents: the required availability of Title IV-D services to nonAFDC families, 42 U.S.C. § 657(c); the fifty dollar "pass through" requirement, id.
§ 657(b); and the required annual notice to families of the support collected on their
behalf, id. § 654(5).
98. S. Rep. No. 93-1356, at 51-52 (1974). reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133,
8146.
99. H.R_ Rep. No. 98-527, at 29-30 (1984).
100. See Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1565-66 (lth Cir. 1989); Mason v.
Bradley, 789 F. Supp. 273, 277 (N.D. 11. 1992).
101. 875 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1989).
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operate (unless good cause for refusing to do so is determined to
exist) in whatever legal action the state undertakes. By assigning
their child support rights in return for AFDC aid, they give the
states the opportunity to recoup the financial drain imposed by the
welfare system on the state and federal treasuries. As was its intent,
as evidenced by the language of the statute and the legislative history, diminishing the welfare outlay benefits society as a whole.
Consistent with that intent, we cannot hold that Title IV-D creates
'02
enforceable rights ....
The court's analysis then, focused on the intent of Congress in recouping welfare expenditures, and relied on the automatic provision of
legal services and assignment of rights in finding no intent to directly
serve parents. 103 This same analysis had been a determinative basis
for finding no attorney-client relationship with parents at the state
court level as 1well,
even in instances where there is no receipt of pub04
lic assistance.
The Supreme Court addressed these conflicting authorities in Blessing v. Freestone.105 In Blessing, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Title IV-D created an enforceable right to have Arizona's
child support program achieve "substantial compliance" with the requirements of Title IV-D. 1°6 The Supreme Court reversed, but its

opinion did not entirely resolve the issue of whether IV-D creates any
enforceable rights. The Court found that the Ninth Circuit erred by
taking a blanket approach to determining whether Title IV-D grants
rights to plaintiffs.1"7 The Supreme Court noted that it is "impossible
to determine whether Title IV-D, as an undifferentiated whole, gives
rise to undefined 'rights." ' 108 Rather, the Court concluded that plaintiffs need to plead with particularity the specific rights created and the
specific laws creating those rights.0 9 If done, the lower court would
then conduct a "methodical inquiry" applying a three-part test for determining whether such a right exists." 0 The test requires that:
102. Id. at 1566 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
103. See id.

104. See County of Santa Clara v. Support, Inc., 152 Cal. Rptr. 754, 763 (Ct. App.
1979); Haney v. State, 850 P.2d 1087, 1090-92 (Okla.1993); Medsker v. Adult & Family Servs. Div., 601 P.2d 865, 867 (Or. 1979); Gibson v. Johnson, 582 P.2d 452, 456 (Or.
1978); State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Huffman, 332 S.E.2d 866, 869-70 (W. Va.
1985).
105. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
106. Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantial compliance is "(a) full compliance with requirements that services be offered statewide ...
(b) 90 percent compliance with case opening and closing (c) 75 percent compliance
with most remaining program requirements." Blessing, 520 U.S. at 335 (summarizing
45 CFR § 305.20 (1995)).
107. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 344.
108. Id. at 342.
109. Id. at 342-43.
110. Id. at 343.
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[First,] Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
right assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.
Third, the statute
111 must unambiguously impose a binding obligation
on the States.

While the Court concluded that the "substantial compliance" standard
did not create enforceable 11rights
under this test, it posited that other
2
parts of the statute might.
Since Blessing, litigants have attempted to establish private rights of
action to enforce a broad range of specific aspects of the IV-D lawall without success. In Brinkley v. Hill,"3 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that a broad
range of specific provisions created no private rights of actions. 14
These included requirements that the agency pursue support procedures within thirty days of identifying delinquency; provide an opportunity for alleged fathers to voluntary establish paternity; establish
substantial compliance standards; maintain an adequate case record;
notify employers of the duty to withhold wages; create a Federal Parent Locator Service; and pay the fifty dollar pass through 15 (the requirement Justice O'Connor suggested might create a private
right)." 6 The court found that the intent of each of these sections was
to improve the overall efficiency of the program rather that to benefit
individual custodial parents."17 Once again, however, the court suggested other provisions in the IV-D statutes relating to notice might
create a private right." 8 The court followed its analysis of legislative
intent with some telling reflections on the nine previous years in which
it had recognized a private right of action.
[W]hile the Court makes no apologies for its actions over the past
nine years, and in fact feels as though its endeavors have required
the CAO to achieve higher standards, the Court none-the-less [sic]
recognizes that it ultimately became part of a process that involved
micro-management of the CAO. The ensuing micro-management
should truthfully come as no surprise. After all, what alternate path
is left a court which begins from a premise that holds custodial parents have a generalized right to have the state agency efficiently
comply with all statutory and regulatory requirements? Requiring
Defendants here to effectively comply necessitates delving into the
111. Id at 340-41 (citations omitted).
112. See i. at 345-46. The Court identified one such possible provision as § 657,

requiring "pass through" to recipients of the first fifty dollars of support payments
obtained by the program. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) (1994).
113. 981 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
114. See id. at 439.
115. See id. at 438-41.
116. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 345-46.
117. See Brinkley, 981 F. Supp. at 439-41.
118. See id. at 436-37.
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minutia of the Defendants' day-to-day operations. Clearly the
United States Supreme Court now recognizes that fact, as well as
the impropriety of following such a course, or beginning with such a
premise.
In the court's opinion, one can hear a sigh of relief at having found
a solution to the obvious ethical difficulties presented by identifying
the parent as the client, and the administrative nightmare of courts
trying to protect the interests of the parents so identified. The solution-characterizing parents as "recipients" or "witnesses" rather
than clients-was consistent with the changing structure of IV-D enforcement as well. IV-D attorneys were increasingly incorporated
into state government agencies with "other significant law enforcement responsibilities, such as the Attorney General's Office or the
State Department of Revenue.' 2 0° The attorneys in these agencies
would be less likely to view themselves as private attorneys hired by
the state to represent individuals and more in the role of "prosecutors" enforcing state laws.' 2 '
Implicit in this analysis was an assumption that the role of IV-D
attorneys is an either/or choice. Prosecutors serve the public interest.12 2 They may not simultaneously serve conflicting private interests."23 Likewise, attorneys for private interests may not be delegated
prosecutorial power.'2 4 Therefore, IV-D attorneys must either represent parents' private interests or the public's interest, but dual representation is not possible."z An interpretation that the IV-D attorney
represents the parents presents too many ethical conflicts given the
constraints placed on that relationship by the statutes. Thus, the preferred solution would be to characterize parents as something other
than clients.
This "solution" to the ethical dilemmas presented by IV-D representation spread quietly but rapidly through state legislatures. For example, Texas law had long provided that "[a]ttorneys employed by the
119. Id.
120. Ira Mark Ellman et al., Family Law 578 (3d ed. 1998).
121. "Texas has dramatically improved its collection rates by recognizing child support collection as a law enforcement problem instead of merely a 'welfare problem."'
Calhoun, Juggernaut,supra note 5, at 957.
122. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998).
123. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. C-772 (1964).
124. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793-96
(1987); see also Department of Social Servs. v. Montero, 758 P.2d 690, 695 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1988) (stating that the appointment of an interested prosecutor is never harmless error); Woodside v. Woodside, Appeal No. 01-A-01-9503-PB-00121, 1995 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 694, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995) (finding it unconstitutional to
appoint a wife's attorney as the private prosecutor of a criminal contempt action
brought against the husband for failure to pay child support).
125. This was the analysis relied upon by the court in Haney v. State, 850 P.2d 1087,
1092 (Okla. 1993).
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attorney general may represent the state or other parties in a suit to
establish or modify a child support obligation, collect child support, or
determine paternity ....

."I"

In 1996, however, this language was

amended to disclaim any representation of individual parties and to
declare the state the sole client. 127 Similar amendments have occurred

or have been proposed in the laws of most other states.1 28 In some
states, the effect1 29of this legislation has been clarified further through
ethics opinions.

Today, it is difficult to locate a state in which one can fully support
the assumption that the parent is the client of a IV-D attorney.
Nearly all state statutes expressly disclaim an attorney-client relationship with parents or children or define the relationship as one in which
the enforcement attorney represents the state or enforcement agency
alone. The majority of states avoid the conflict of interests in representation of parents by negative language precluding any attorney-client privilege between the agency attorney and the parents.130 Some
state statutes indicate that the IV-D agency or attorneys performing
child support enforcement functions represent the state1 31 or the de126. Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 76.007 (West 1990) (emphasis added).
127. See Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 231.0012 (\Vest Supp. 1999).
128. For a look at pre- and post-amendment statutes, compare Ark. Code Ann. § 914-210 (1991), with Act of Apr. 1, 1997, (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http:/I
www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/acts/1997.htm/1296.htm> (codified as amended at Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-14-210(d) (1995)); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 257.69 (1992), and Act of June
1, 1995 (visited Feb. 27, 1999) <http'/www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us.slas.1995/
c257.html> (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.255 (1996)).
129. See Board of Prof'l Responsibility, Supreme Court of Tenn., Formal Ethics
Op. 90-F-123 (1990); Committee on Legal Ethics, Oregon State Bar Ass'n, Formal
Op. 527 (1989); Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Virginia State Bar, Opinion 964
(1988) (stating that the department is the sole client and specifically negating a relationship with parents or others); J. Anthony McLain, Opinions of the General Counsel, Alabama's Child Support ProgramL Ethical Procedures,Ala. Law., Nov. 1996, at
361, 361-63.
130. See Ala. Code § 38-10-7.1 (Supp. 1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-509 (West
Supp. 1998); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-14-210(d) (Michie 1995); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 11478.2(a) (West Supp. 1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-102 (1998); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 409.2564(5) (West 1998); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-11-23 (Supp. 1998) (stating that the
"department shall be the sole client"); 305 I1. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5110-3.1 (West
Supp. 1998); Kan. Stat. Ann. §39-756(b)(3)(e) (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 205.712
(Michie 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A, § 2103(5) (Vest 1998); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 119A, § 3 (Law Co.-op. 1994); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.255 (Vest Supp. 1999); Miss.
Code Ann. § 43-19-35(3) (1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 568.040(1) (West 1979); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 125B.150(3) (Michie 1998); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-09-09.27 (1997);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 56, § 237.3(B) (West Supp. 1999); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25.030
(1988); S.C. Code Ann. § 43-5-590 (West Supp. 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-3-124(d)
(1995); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 231.109 (Vest 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9(3)
(1996); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 74.20.220 (West Supp. 1999); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 48A-2-21(b) (Michie 1998); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.075(2)(b) (West 1993).
131. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-509 (\Vest Supp. 1998) (authorizing the district
attorney to intervene); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-231(t)(1) (Vest 1995); Iowa Code
Ann. § 252B.7(4) (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 254 (McKinney 1999); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 110-135 (1995).
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partment, 32 often with no explicit indication that the representation is
intended to be exclusive. Some use both affirmative and negative language, with some detail as to the effect on powers.1 33 Kansas, for example, provides:
[T]he social and rehabilitation services' attorney or the attorneys
with whom such agency contracts to provide such [enforcement of
child support and establishment of paternity] services shall represent the state department of social and rehabilitation services.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify statutory mandate, authority
or confidentiality required by any governmental
34
agency.

Statutes as comprehensive as these significantly impact the ethical responsibilities of the enforcement attorney, seemingly eliminating the
conflicts and limitations imposed when parents are considered clients.
Query, however, whether an attorney-client relationship be precluded

so simply. Can one simply waive a magic legislative wand and characterize those who appear to be clients as something other?

132. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 409.2564(5) (West 1998) (defining attorney as one representing the department); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-11-23(b) (Supp. 1998) (noting that the
department shall be the sole client); R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-9-3 (1996) (stating that the
enforcement attorney "shall represent the department of children, youth, and families"); S.D. Codified Laws § 28-1-11 (Michie 1998); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9 (2)(C)
(1996).
133. For example, the California statute states:
In all actions involving paternity or support ...

the district attorney and

Attorney General represent the public interest in establishing, modifying,
and enforcing support obligations. No attorney-client relationship shall be
deemed to have been created between the district attorney or Attorney
General and any person by virtue of the action of the district attorney or the
Attorney General in carrying out these statutory duties.
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 11478.2(6) (West Supp. 1999); see Col. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-102
(1998) (authorizing the district attorney to use any remedy, including criminal and
civil sanctions, and specifying the state as the client); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:236.1
(West Supp. 1999) (stating that the attorney "shall represent the state of Louisiana,
Department of Social Services exclusively"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19A, § 2103(5)
(West 1998) (stating that the attorney represents solely the interest of the state); Miss.
Code Ann. § 43-19-35(3) (1993) (stating that the attorney represents State Department of Human Services exclusively); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125B.150(3) (Michic
1998) (stating that the attorney represents the state, specifically negating other attorney-client relationships); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-09-09.27 (1997) (same); Okla.
Stat. tit. 56, § 237.3 (West Supp. 1999) (same); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25.080 (1988)
(stating that the attorney is responsible for providing support enforcement services on
behalf of the state); S.C. Code Ann. § 43-5-590 (Supp. 1998) (stating that the attorney
represents state, and specifically negates other attorney-client relationships). Even in
the few states that do retain statutes indicating that the public attorney represents the
parent or child, the practice is to treat the representation as a dual representation and
have the client waive any conflicts or confidentiality restrictions.
134. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-756(e) (1993).
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III. THE POWER OF LEGISLATURES TO DISCLAIM AN
ATrORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

State courts have the authority to regulate the practice of law even
without any legislative or express constitutional authorization. Most
courts say that the power to regulate attorneys is simply "inherent,"
that is, essential to what it means to be a court.'3 5 Most courts maintain that these inherent powers vest in the courts upon their creation.'3 6 The definition of a court's inherent powers to regulate the
practice of ' 1law
has been described as "nebulous, and its bounds as
'shadowy."" 3 7 For most courts, however, the power is interpreted
broadly to include the power to "define and regulate all facets of the
practice of law, including the admission of attorneys to the bar, the
professional responsibility and conduct of lawyers, the discipline, suspension and disbarment of lawyers, and the client-attorney
relationship."' 3 8
Whether a IV-D attorney represents a parent as a client would be
the type of determination that traditionally falls within the inherent
power of the courts. Any determination of a lawyer's duty must first
identify to whom that duty is owed. Indeed, one of the most common
exercises of courts' inherent power is ruling on disqualification mo135. See, e.g., Exparte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856) ("[lit has been well
settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with
the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney
and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.").
136. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 224 (1821); see also Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962) (stating that inherent powers are "necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs"). Some state constitutions provide
that their supreme court has power to make rules governing attorney admission and
discipline. See, e.g., Ark. Const. amend. 28 ("The Supreme Court shall make rules
regulating the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law."); Fla.
Const. art. V, § 15 ("The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."); Ky. Const. § 116 ("The Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern admission to the
bar and the discipline of members of the bar."); Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2 ("The
supreme court ... may make rules governing... admission to the bar and the conduct

of its members."); NJ. Const. art. VI, § 3 1 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."); Pa. Const. art. V, § 10 ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts ... including
... admission to the bar and to practice law .... "). Most other courts derive their
inherent power from the more general grants of power to courts provided for in their
constitutions. This inherent power of the judicial branch of government to regulate
the practice of law does not depend on any express constitutional grant or on the
legislative will; rather, it exists because of the intimate connection between the practice of law and the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice. See De
Krasner v. Boykin, 186 S.E. 701,704-05 (Ga. 1936). At the federal level, while federal
courts claim an inherent power to regulate attorneys appearing before them, Congress has also expressly delegated that power to the lower federal courts. See Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994).
137. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
138. Succession of Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348, 350 (La. 1991) (citations omitted).
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tions. In ruling on those motions, courts must regularly decide the
"client identity" issue.
The question truly is not whether courts have the power to deem an
attorney-client relationship present. The question is whether that
power is exclusive to the courts. Courts are extremely reluctant to
directly address the constitutionality of state legislation under this
"negative inherent powers" doctrine. 13 9 Courts avoid facing this issue
by finding that the statutes are ones of broad general application or, to
the extent the statutes are addressed to the practice of law only, are
compatible with or supplement the courts' powers. While many
courts say that they have the exclusive power to regulate the practice
of law, they nonetheless will enforce legislation regulating lawyers as a
matter of comity.
Under this doctrine of exclusive inherent powers, would a state statutory disclaimer of an attorney-client relationship be constitutional?
Can these statutes effectively preclude an attorney-client relationship?
To predict the answer to that question, one might look to the treatment by courts of legislation allowing attorneys to practice in corporate forms that limit liability. 4 ° A number of courts have held that
the statutes insulating those who operate within professional corporations and limited liability partnerships could not be applied to attorneys, as the determination of liability for breach of an attorney's
duty
14 1
is within the sole province of the courts to determine.
Likewise, it seems that courts could rightly conclude that statutes
disclaiming an attorney-client relationship between IV-D attorneys
and parents would also be unconstitutional under a separation of powers analysis. Such statutes are not ones of general applicability-they
are directed at attorneys only-and so within the court's authority.
Moreover, a fairly strong argument exists "that a direct and funda139. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 2.2.3, at 27-31 (1986) (discussing
negative inherent powers of the courts).
140. See Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Cncible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S.Tex. L. Rev. 359, 370-73 (1998); see
also Debra L. Thill, Comment, The Inherent Powers Doctrine and Regulation of the
Practiceof Law: Will Minnesota Attorneys Practicingin Professional Corporationsor
Limited Liability Companies Be Denied the Benefit of Statutory Liability Shields?, 20
Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 1143, 1163-70 (1994) (discussing the courts' use of inherent
powers to invalidate the liability shield for attorneys).
141. See, e.g., In re The Fla. Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 557 (Fla. 1961) (approving lawyer
practice in professional corporations but noting that the court would have the power
to decide otherwise); First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675-76 (Ga.
1983) (holding that attorneys may limit liability through the corporate form), overruled by Henderson v. HSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 885, 886 (Ga. 1996) (overruling Zagoria "to the extent it states that this court, rather than the legislative enabling
act, determines the ability of lawyers to insulate themselves from personal liability");
In re Bar Assoc., 516 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Haw. 1973) (refusing to allow limited liability);
Sanders, Bruin, Coll & Worley, P.A. v. McKay Oil Corp., 943 P.2d 104, 107-09 (N.M.
1997) (holding that a professional corporation statute cannot confer limited liability
for an attorney-shareholder).
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mental conflict exists between the operation of the statute in question,
as it applies to attorneys, and attorneys' settled ethical obligations, as
embodied in this state's Rules of Professional Conduct or some wellestablished common law rule."' 14 2 The rules governing the creation of
the attorney-client relationship increasingly base the existence of that
relationship on the reasonable expectations of the client.1 43 The Restatement (Third) of the Lav Governing Lawyers, for example, declares that an attorney-client relationship is established when "a
person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person" and either the lawyer "manifests to
the person consent to do so" or "the lawyer fails to manifest lack of
consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services."'" Thus, a statute that would attempt to disclaim an attorneyclient relationship where the facts are such that the parent reasonably
expected they were being represented would indeed interfere with the
function of the courts in regulating the ethical standards of attorney
practice.
IV-D attorneys appear to recognize that these statutory disclaimers
will not, by themselves, free the attorney from representation of the
parents. For example, in a memorandum distributed to child support
enforcement attorneys, the Kansas Child Support Enforcement Program instructs attorneys that they should advise all applicants and recipients of the child support enforcement program's services of their
role and refer to the applicant or recipient of services as their "client"
14 5
in order to avoid even an "implied" attorney-client relationship.
Other steps that IV-D programs require of attorneys include:
removing references to the parent or child as 'clients' in all statutes,
regulations, policies, forms, and legal pleadings; captioning all legal
pleadings relating to the delivery of IV-D services for establishment
and enforcement of child support in the name of the State, and
clearly specifying that the IV-D attorney is not the attorney for
either of the parents; and, notifying both parents in writing that the
IV-D agency or its attorneys do not represent
46 either parent and that
either parent may obtain private counsel.'
142. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142,
1152 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
143. See Note, An Expectations Approad to Client Identtit, 106 Harv. L Rev. 687,
688 (1993) (discussing the newly emerging "reasonable constituent's expectation approach" to determining the attorney's relationship with corporate constituents).
144. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 26 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996).
145. Memorandum from Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs., Child Support Enforcement Program, to CSE Attorneys (March 9, 1992) (on file with author).
For more information, contact Chief of Litigation, Child Support Enforcement Program (913) 296-2629.
146. OCSE, Delivering Program Services, supra note 56 (quoting State Best Practices in Child Support Enforcement (OCSE-IM-92-05, Oct. 19, 1992)).
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Despite the strong basis for declaring these statutes void under separation of powers analysis, this argument has not been addressed directly by the courts called upon to use these statutes. Rather, the
courts have simply concluded that there is no attorney-client relationship between the IV-D attorney and the parent. 147 The only decision
with language even appearing to recognize the issue is Gibson v. Johnson,14 8 an Oregon Court of Appeals decision in which a class action
was filed seeking injunctive relief against the Department of Human
Resources to improve its child support collection practices. The class
was made up of public assistance recipients who had or would be
asked to cooperate in enforcing support orders. 149 The court held
that, given the assignment of rights required by Oregon law and the
duty of cooperation imposed on parents, the IV-D attorney must obviously represent only the state.150 No statute dictated this result, however, and in a concurring opinion, Judge Joseph commented, "This is
not a case in which a trial judge has exercised his inherent power to
control the conduct of lawyers involved in litigation before him. ' It
is a
51
class action on behalf of a very large and ever changing class."'
Accordingly, while it seems that courts might indeed have a basis
for invalidating these statutory disclaimers, they are unlikely to take
on this battle. Professor Wolfram has opined that the inherent powers
doctrine has been so seriously undermined as to make it an unlikely
battleground: "Both the splintering of bar support for or at least interest in preserving the doctrine and its obvious internal weakness
may mean that in the future it will be resorted to less frequently by
courts.' 152 Certainly, courts are unlikely to invoke their exclusive
power to regulate the practice of law when the result of declaring void
a statutory disclaimer of liability would be to place the courts in the
managerial center of "a tactical stage in a wide-ranging strategic dispute between the Attorney General and the [child support enforcement agencies] on one side and the class [of parents] and its counsel
on the other."' 53
IV.

STATUTORY DISCLAIMERS OF LIABILITY: A SOLUTION TO
ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN GOVERNMENT FUNDING OF
LEGAL SERVICES?

What is the impact of these statutory disclaimers? Does the IV-D
attorney have no duty to the parents? Clearly the IV-D attorney does
147. See, e.g., Haney v. Oklahoma, 850 P.2d 1087, 1090-91 (Okla.1993) (concluding
that "the State was always intended to be the client").
148. 582 P.2d 452, 456 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
149. See id. at 453.

150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at 456.
Id. (Joseph, J., concurring).
Wolfram, supra note 140, at 395.
Gibson, 582 P.2d at 456 (Joseph, J., concurring).
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not have those duties that one would owe to a client, though legislation may place some closely analogous duties upon enforcement attorneys. One effect of these statutes is to deny custodial parents any
control in pursuing paternity or child support actions. Because the
state is the client, the state alone has the right to control the actions of
the attorney. 154 The client is "forced" to communicate and cooperate
with the attorney in the pursuit of pre-determined goals, even if these
goals and communications may be against the parent's interest. For
example, the custodial parent may wish to use the threat of a formal
support action to encourage the non-custodial parent to resume or
begin to provide informal (financial or in-kind) support. The custodial parent may disclose that he or she has received such informal
support in the past without disclosing that to the public assistance
agency (thus raising fraud issues). Other custodial parents may want
to sever all ties with the non-custodial parent because of a fear of
excessive interference or abuse. 155 While states do have good cause
exceptions to the rules of mandatory cooperation, 15 6 where an action
would pose a safety threat, these exceptions are very narrow and
poorly communicated to the parents. In nearly all cases where there is
a finding that good cause excusing cooperation exists, the result is that
the support action is simply dropped. 57
Because the state-not the parents, the child, or any other individual-is the "client," the recipient of state child support enforcement
services is afforded no attorney-client privilege protection for communications with the enforcement attorney. Statutory mandates of confidentiality, however, may provide some measure of protection for
parents. 58 Several state statutes follow their statutory disclaimer with
language indicating that the statute should not be construed to modify
154. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-756(e) (1993) (stating that "[any representation
by such attorney shall not be construed to create an attorney-client relationship between the attorney and any party").
155. See Irwin Garfinkel, The Child-Support Revolution, 84 Am. Econ. Ass'n Papers & Proceedings 81 (1994)); Joel F. Handler, Welfare Reform: Is It for Real?, 3
Loy. Poverty LJ. 135, 150 (1997) (citing Kathryn Edin, Single Mothers and Child Support The Possibilitiesand Limits of Child Support Policy, 17 Children and Youth
Servs. Rev. 203 (1995)).
156. Forty-three percent of unwed mothers do not want a paternity and support
order. There is some evidence that for never-married fathers, increased support actions will exacerbate tensions and actually harm the children. See David L Chambers,
Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement,
81 Va. L. Rev. 2575, 2600-03 (1995) [hereinafter Chambers, Virtues and Perils].

157. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (Supp. 111996) (providing that states must provide
such a good cause exemption). For an overview of the various state approaches to
good cause, see Center for Law and Social Policy, Inc., State Child Support Cooperation and Good Cause-A PreliminaryLook at State Policies (last modified Oct. 30,
1998) <http://%wvw.clasp.org/pubs/childsupport/coopsum.htm>.
158. See Center for Law and Soc. Pol'y, Inc., Implementing the Family Violence Option: Lessons from Child Support (last modified Mar. 8, 1998) <http://www.clasp.org/
pubs/childenforce/fvo.htm>.
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any "statutory mandate, authority or confidentiality required by any
governmental agency."15 9 While these provisions might protect a custodial parent's privacy as against the general public-in open records
or freedom of information act actions, for example, it would not provide nearly the scope of confidentiality implicit in an attorney-client
relationship. In particular, custodial parents would have no confidentiality vis-a-vis the government. For example, an attorney representing a custodial parent who learns of the client's fraud on the
government (as when a parent is accepting, but not reporting, informal support), the attorney is under a duty in most jurisdictions to refrain from disclosing the fraud. 6 ° The enforcement attorney,
however, would not only be able but also would be required6 to disclose this information as a representative of the state-client.1 1
Likewise, the parent-recipient cannot expect any duty of loyalty
from the enforcement attorney. If a custodial parent has been represented by an enforcement attorney, and there is a later change in custody or the non-custodial parent seeks IV-D assistance in modifying
the support order, the enforcement attorney would face no conflict of
interest bar to bringing an action against the parent whom he or she
previously "represented."'1 62 While courts have found in other contexts that attorneys may be disqualified based on their receipt of confidential information, even if no attorney-client relationship is
established, the waiver of confidentiality these statutes imply may
foreclose even that analysis. To be sure, some statutes require that
enforcement attorneys make this situation63 clear through mandated
disclosures of the limits of confidentiality.
64
Finally, there is no duty of competence that runs to the parent.
One effect of these statutes is to negate the privity upon which malpractice actions depend. Even without privity, however, attorneys
may be liable in malpractice in some circumstances. One might question whether an enforcement attorney could be liable to a custodial
parent under a third-party beneficiary analysis. In his concurring
159. 45 C.F.R. § 307.13 (1998) (noting that states must have written policies concerning access to IV-D data, regularly monitor access and use of data, train employees
on confidentiality policies, and enact administrative penalties for unauthorized disclosure or use).
160. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1998).
161. See id. Rule 1.3.
162. Monterey County v. Cornejo, 812 P.2d 586, 595 (Cal. 1991) (en banc). But see
In re Marriage of Abernethy, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 344-45 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
prior private representation of a father disqualifies the district attorney from representing the mother in proceedings for modification of support orders).
163. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-3-124(D) (1995) (requiring an attorney to inform recipients that they are owed no confidentiality or other "incidents of the lawyer-client relationship").
164. Jager v. County of Alameda, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 293, 294 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that a mother alleged that a district attorney negligently released her child support
lien despite an undercalculation of arrears and interest).
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opinion in Blessing, Justice Scalia raised just such a possibility when
he commented that the third-party beneficiary theory was not available at the time § 1983 was adopted. 165 While that might preclude a
§ 1983 action, it does suggest a state law basis for liability. It seems
likely, however, that even under a third-party beneficiary doctrine,
these statutes would be interpreted to go beyond merely disclaiming
privity and would
create a form of sovereign immunity for the attor66
neys involved.1

Even with immunity, there may be exceptions. Florida's child support enforcement disclaimer, for example, notes that the disclaimer
makes enforcement agents "immune from liability in tort for actions
taken to establish, enforce, or modify support obligations if such actions are taken in good faith, with apparent legal authority, without
malicious purpose, and in a manner not exhibiting wanton and willful
disregard of rights or property of another."167 Even without this limiting language, courts have adopted a functional approach in applying
common law prosecutorial immunity doctrine to public attorneys in
other contexts.168 They could also, again under the inherent powers
doctrine, limit the application of these statutory grants of immunity to
child support enforcement attorneys.
Courts are likely to apply these immunity doctrines broadly to encompass liability, disqualification, and privilege doctrines because the
courts recognize that the legislative purpose in extending these immunities is to create efficient programs on limited budgets. The one clear
exception to immunity, however, regardless of its source, is in discipline. To the extent IV-D attorneys violate their ethical duties, they
are subject to discipline just as any other attorney. 69 This discipline
could encompass not only violating duties to the client (the state) but
also duties of fairness to third parties and candor to the court. Even
here, however, effective control of IV-D attorneys is unlikely. Studies

165. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
166. Cf.Department of Human Resources v. Money, 473 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that sovereign immunity barred tort claims against the department in a child support collection action); Noble v. Office of Child Support, 721 A.2d

121, 124 (Vt. 1998) (noting that sovereign immunity bars actions under the state fair
debt collection statute against the child support agency).

167. Fla. Stat. ch. 409.2564(6) (1998).
168. See, e.g., Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 52-53 (N.M. 1991) (treating the role of
guardian ad litem as one subject to judicial immunity).

169. See Impler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (holding a prosecutor immune from civil suit for damages for initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution
but noting that the immunity does not exempt the prosecutor from professional discipline); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 n.5 (1986) ("The organized bar's
development and enforcement of professional standards for prosecutors also lessen
the danger that absolute immunity will become a shield for prosecutorial
misconduct.").
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of discipline of prosecutors indicate that sanction is rare,
with the pri17
mary sanction being comments in judicial opinions.
Obviously, then, these statutes can have a profound impact on the
provision of child support enforcement services. Without these statutes, attorneys enforcing child support orders on behalf of the state
and the parent would be left with irreconcilable conflicts of interest
and unethical limitations on their independent professional judgment.
Courts would face the burden of sorting out the mess. Instead, these
statutes shift the burden to the attorneys-to provide adequate notice
of the limitations of their role-and to the parents-to insure that
their relationship with the attorney walks the fine balance between
mandated cooperation and guarded privacy. It is not a comfortable
solution for many of the attorneys and clients involved, but it may be
the only practical solution.
CONCLUSION

The child support enforcement attorney assists parents and the state
in establishing paternity and in setting, modifying, and enforcing child
support awards. While the facts of the representation might in many
instances look as if this is a dual representation, state legislatures have
acted to counter that appearance. Statutes disclaim any attorney-client relationship between the public attorney and anyone other than
the state. While one might argue that this type of legislation conflicts
with the court's inherent power to control the practice of law, courts
are unlikely to accept that argument for both theoretical and practical
reasons.
The real question for this conference, however, is not the scope and
effectiveness of these statutes in avoiding the ethical dilemmas posed
by the government attorney's role in child support enforcement. The
interesting question is whether this same approach could be taken to
avoiding ethical dilemmas in a wide variety of settings in which the
government funds legal assistance to low-income persons. Is it too
far-fetched to imagine recipients of federal or state housing assistance
also being provided-and then required to cooperate with-legal
assistance in enforcing their rights against private landlords? How
about legal assistance in pursing actions against employers or doctors
as a benefit/condition of unemployment compensation or medical
benefits? Could legal aid offices be slowly transformed into government agencies for enforcement of public 171rights against those who
commit the "crime" of "causing poverty"?
170. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 851, 896-99
(1995).
171. Recall that courts have held legal aid attorneys to be government officials for
other purposes. See, e.g., Dixon v. Georgia Indigent Legal Servs., Inc., 388 F. Supp.
1156, 1161-62 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (considering a legal aid attorney funded by the Office
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Would this approach be preferable to more limited restrictions on
attorneys funded by the government? Would it more accurately reflect the relationship of the entities and parties involved? Which is
better: for attorneys to "mirandize" the individuals they serve with an
"I am not your lawyer" speech; or for attorneys to ask their clientsmany of whom have no alternative sources for legal assistance-to
"consent" to limitations on the attorney's representation imposed by
the government funding? The former approach casts the "deserving
poor" in the role of victims and does little to empower them or allow
them individualized representation. The latter approach places attorneys in the thick of the ethical dilemmas and resource limitations
which have been the subject of this conference. Of course, neither
approach is optimal of course. Neither approach is an effective substitute for adequate, unrestricted funding to ensure equal access to justice. Advocates for low-income persons may find, however, that the
battle against funding restrictions may only be the first step in an
overall trend toward redefining government-funded legal services in
even more fundamental ways.

of Economic Opportunity to be a federal officer for the purpose of a statute permitting removal to federal court), affd, 532 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1976); Gurda Farms, Inc.
v. Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., 358 F. Supp. 841, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)

(same).
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